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ABSTRACT
There is probably no single commodity more vital than petroleum to
the conduct of military operations and to the industrial economy that must
support it. Although there was a single manag-" established for Pel!
Logistic Support, certain responsibilities remained with the individual
Services „ Because of its vital nature and the resource constraints
placed on the Department of Defense , it is imperative that the Petroleum
Logistic System be the most dependable, responsive, srtd economical
system possible. Does the present =day modified single manager plan
meet these criteria? If fully integrated, would the system prov:. le
additional economies?
The author arrives at the conclusion that the current system is
dependable and responsive . Further , that economies to be gained under
the single manager concept are being reaped from the modified plan in
operation today.
This writer wishes to express his appreciation for the assistance
and encouragement given to him by Commander Sherman W, Blandm, Supply
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INTRODUCTION
On 19 January 1948., James Forres tal, then Secretary of Defense, m-j
the following statement before the Special Subcommittee on Petroleum of
the Armed Services Committee of the House of Representatives : "There was
a time when the major item of supply to a fighting force was food, as
Napoleon graphically pointed out when he said that an army marches on its
stomach. In World War II, however, the volume cf liquid fuel shipped over-
seas was nearly 16 times that of food. Petroleum and petroleum products
1
amounted to over 60 percent of the overseas military shipments „"
changing emphasis on petroleum and its products during World War II is
further reflected in two statements by Admiral Chester Nimitz. At the
beginning of the war he said that winning the war was a metter of "bean
bullets, and oil". Before the end of the war he revised his statement and
2
said, "Now it's oil, bullets, and beans."
It is estimated that in the later months of 1951, petroleum comprised
as much as 62 percent of the total tonnage required for the support of the
3
United Nations forces in Korea. Even the advent of fissionable energy
sources and global ballistic missiles in the military has not decreased
the ever-growing demands for petroleum Military-planned procurement
in 1965 is expected to increase approximately 17 000,000 barrels over
Bureau of Naval Personnel, Fundamentals of Petroleum, NAVPERS 10883
Department of the Navy, 1953, p, 1.
2
Bureau of Naval Personnel, Petroleum Logistics, NAVPERS 10892,








the requirements for Fiscal Year 1961. During 1961, deliveries were at
a high of 722 000 barrels per day as compared with peak mobilization con-
sumption during World War II of over 1,000,000 barrels per day.
Impressive as these facts appear, of greater significance is the
staggering petroleum requirements in the event of another war. Speak-
ing before the Canada-United States Permanent Joint Board on Defense in
August 1948, Captain J. M. Boyd, USN, said, "All of the probable military
requirements for petroleum products, when added together, will be in the
vicinity of 9 to 10 million barrels per day." With the increasing re-
quirements of aviation fuels required by the high performance aircraft
today, bigger carriers (powered by black oil), and bigger and faster
destroyer-type ships, the estimate of Captain Boyd may well be low.
Considered alternatively, the utilization of fissionable energy may gain
momentum with developments of economical and practical means of apply-
ing this source of power on a much wider scale., thereby decreasing bulk
petroleum requirements. Until such sources of power are avialable,
however, petroleum will retain its vital importance in over-all logistic
support. Thus petroleum in modern warfare is an indispensable material
which is used in tremendous quantities. There is probably no single
4
Clyde La Mottee , "Military Fuel Demand is Going Up Again", The
Oil and Gas Journal, October 30, 1961, pp 99-101.
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commodity more vital to the conduct of military operations and to the in-
dustrial economy that must support it,, Significant to this statement., was
the confession of Admiral Togoda (Chief, Naval Combined Forces, Japan) who
stated that "Japanese loss of tankers and oil resources precluded further
large scale Naval operations against the United States in 1945."
From this discussion emerges the fact that a primary factor in the
development of our military defense system is economics --economics which
deals with the allocation of scarce resources. We must seek to improve
our national defense by the means of increasing the effectiveness of this
allocation.
The approach of this paper is to give broad coverage to the basic
elements of military petroleum logistics—primarily bulk petroleum, Navy
oriented. Included are the various organizations concerned with petroleum,
historical highlights of the petroleum logistics system, and an analysis of
that system today.
The military essentiality of petroleum is absolute with little
opportunity for substitution. Because of its vital importance,, the limited
resource constraints, and the extremely high expenditure of funds for mil-
itary petroleum requirements, it is mandatory for the Department of Defense
to provide the most dependable, responsive, and economical petroleum
logistic system possible.





MILITARY ORGANIZATION FOR PETROLEUM
General .
The special position petroleum occupies in the planning and
execution of military operations requires the closest attention and
coordination at all levels of government „ Excessive and sporadic demands
during emergencies , with limited resources available, make it imperative
that a responsive control system be provided to fill priority needs of
the Services o In order to insure an integrated approach to the distri-
bution of petroleum resources,, many agencies are closely interwoven to
this end with the Secretary of Interior being the focal point for the
numerous petroleum matters of concern to the government. Chart l
s
page
5, depicts the principal government agencies concerned directly with pe-
troleum- However, this discussion will be directed primarily to the
Department of Defense (DOD) petroleum organization and those responsi-
bilities pertaining to petroleum logistics in the Navy. Chart 2, page
6
,
portrays the DOD organization.
Petroleum is different .
One might ask why so many offices and agencies are concerned with
petroleum; also, what makes it different from other commodities. First,
it is one of the few commodities that is absolutely essenti al to both
military operations and to the industrial activities that must go on
uninterrupted in support of the Armed Forces. Second, the sources are
world-wide. Hence, the political and ecomonic climates of various un-
related geographical locations have profound effects on markets and



























































































sumption makes it impossible to store but a fraction of our wartime , or
even peacetime, requirements. For these reasons
,
petroleum has been sin-
gled out ever since World War II days, as the only commodity for special-
ized handling from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) level down through
o
the departments and the overseas commands
.
Assistant Secretary of De fe ns e for Installation and Logistics
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installation and Logistics
(ASDI&L) is responsible for advising and assisting the Secretary of Defense
in the establishment of effective policies and systems for efficient
and economical operation of the Department of Defense (DOD) in the supply
and logistics field of procurement
,
production,, distribution;, trans-
portation, storage, cataloging, requirements, and mobilization planning.
Within DOD the focal point for petroleum policy is the Office of Petrol-
eum Logistics Policy in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense.
This is the only organization in the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) which is concerned purely with a single commodity. This division,,
based on the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Strategic and Logistic Plans,
forwards planning assumptions and guidance to the Department of Interior
for determining the capability of industry to support war plans; and, in
turn, it evaluates comments on support capability to determine if strategic
plans can be supported logistically
„
Joints Chiefs of Staff Organization
The function of the Joints Chiefs of Staff Organization (JCS) is
basically to provide for formulation of military strategy and joint
c
Defense Petroleum Supply Center, Petroleum Management s HQ , DPSC
4100.1, Handbook, p. 3.

logistic plans and assignment of logistic responsibilities to the military
departments in support of such plans. All petroleum matters originating
within the JCS organization and petroleum matters referred to the agency
are coordinated by the JCS Logistics Plans Committee with detailed
study usually being performed by a unit within the Joint Logistic Plans
Group known as the Petroleum Team.
Office of Naval Petroleum and Oil Shale Reserves .
Under the cognizance of the Secretary of the Navy, there is an
Office of Naval Petroleum and Oil Shale Reserves,, Its function is to
explore, prospect, conserve, develop, use, operate, and administer the
Naval Petroleum Reserves, administer the Naval Oil Shale Reserves, and
serve as the principal Department of the Navy advisory office on matters
relating to crude petroleum, both domestic and foreign. The Navy is the
only service having Petroleum Reserves per se (See Chapter II, Page 12 ).
Chief of Naval Operations «,
The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) is responsible for the logistic
support of the Operating Forces of the Navy and such Navy component forces
of Unified or Specified Commands, as may be assigned by higher authority.
Within the CNO organization, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Logistic
Plans Division, has the responsibility for the following specific functions
relating to petroleum:
L Establishing Navy world-wide levels of supply and mobilization
reserve stocks of the principal bulk petroleum products.




3„ Furnish advice and guidance to Bureau of Naval Personnel on
the Petroleum Program of the Naval Reserve.
4„ Promulgate petroleum consumption factors (except aviation fuels)
for vessels and shore stations.
5. Coordinate the preparation and determination of petroleum
requirements in terms of product and storage space necessary to support
current and future plans.
6. Prepare broad Navy petroleum policies and plans in so far as
they affect the logistic support of the Naval Establishment.
Bureau of Supplies and Accounts
The Bureau of Supplies and Accounts (BuSandA) is responsible for
the procurement, funding, storage , and issue of all petroleum products
required by the Navy„ Prior to 1953, these functions were performed by
the Bureau's Fuel Division. However, in January of 1953, a Fuel Supply
Office (FSO) was established to perform the petroleum functions pre-
viously assigned to the Fuel Division. It is the responsibility of the
Navy Fuel Supply Office, under the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts , to
assure a proper balance between the supply and demand for petroleum
products under its control. The mission of FSO relates to the three major
steps in the logistic process : (1) requirements determination showing
the total for each type of bulk fuel--also, where and when they are needed,
(2) procurement through Defense Fuel Supply Center (DFSC) , and (3) direct
9distribution of bulk products purchased by DFSC.
In exercising inventory control, FSO establishes minimum and maximum
9
The DFSC organization is discussed in Chapter II

stock levels of supply for the various items, interprets and processes
stock status reports, analyzes operation data to effect replenishment of
bulk stocks within continental United States, and, also, determines and
initiates disposal action for excess stocks.
Navy bulk fuel terminal facilities throughout the world are financed
by BuSandA and are under its management and technical control— this control
being exercised by FSO. This office recommends to the Assistant Chief of
the Bureau for Supply Management the fuel-facility requirements for use
in current, mobilization, and logistic code planning, based on directives
from CNO,
Military Sea Transportation Service .
Prior to 1949, the Navy operated and maintained its own independent
transportation service at sea. With the advent of the Single Manager
for Ocean Transportation in August 1949, the Military Sea Transportation
Service (MSTS) has since been responsible for the sea transportation of
bulk petroleum for the entire Department of Defense, The transportation
function of MSTS is considered to be an integral part of the overall
logistic operation within the Navy. MSTS accomplishes delivery through
(1) a nucleus fleet of Navy-owned, Navy-manned oilers and Navy-owned
tankers which are contract-manned and operated, and (2) industry-furnished
tankers through the Voluntary Tanker Plan. The latter was developed
to meet emergency situations by industry to preclude the necessity of




HISTORICAL HIGHLIGHTS OF THE PETROLEUM LOGISTIC SYSTEM
General ,
Military petroleum management has advanced through various stages
of independent , competitive procurement, joint purchasing, single de-
partment purchasing assignment, and finally a modified defense single
manager concept. A resume 1 of this development follows to show how,
throughout the history of fuel procurement, the various procurement
organizations have had to operate in somewhat of a different environment
than other commodities in the supply field.
Prior to World War I.
Jane's "Fighting Ships" shows that in 1901, four of the eight lead-
ing naval powers (England, The United States, Japan, and Austira) were
not using oil as a fuel on any ships. However, in the United States, much
experimentation was underway during this period. In 1907 contracts were
let for the construction of battleships 28 and 29 (The Delaware and North
Dakota), which included in the specifications a paragraph that "Provision
will be made for burning fuel oil in the furnaces „" This marked the begin-
ning of the real fuel oil era.
Perhaps the greatest hindrance to the assured development of such
equipment and eventual installation in all Naval ships was the uncertainty
of the source of fuel oil supply. The oil industry was in its infanc and
not much was known about how much oil the United States could produce and
for how long. Even if the oil were available, another large problem
10
J„ E. Hamilton, LT , USN, "A Short History of Naval Use of Fuel Oil"
Journal of the American Society of Naval Engineers , August^ 1933, p„ 278,
11

loomed on the horizon--the problem of distribution, since oil could not
be obtained for naval ships in all ports of call. Thus, from the begin-
ning of the oil era in the Navy, the Navy has encountered problems of oil
supply, and the attendant distribution problems associated therewith.
Petroleum and Oil Shale Reserves .
Because of the uncertainty of the fuel oil supply and the obvious
future need for oil by the Navy, it was considered necessary to withdraw
certain oil bearing lands from the public domain,, Through a span of
years following 1912, certain lands believed to contain oil were estab-
lished as reserves to insure a supply of fuel for the Navy, which was then
in the process of change-over from coal to petroleum as a source of power.
Charts 3 and 4 pages 13 and 14 show the location of these reserves'.
Reserve No. 1 (Elk Hills) was set aside in September 1912 to ensure
a supply of 500,000,000 barrels of fuel for the Navy. At this time, how-
ever, no actual discoveries of oil had been made by drilling on this land;
the selection had been founded on general knowledge of geology. Subse-
quent exploration has proven the wisdom of choice. Because of the un-
certainty as to the amount of oil Elk Hills might contain, a Reserve No. 2
(Buena Vista Hills) was created later in 1912. Both of these reserves
were, and still are, located in Kern County, California „ In 1914 the
Secretary of the Navy asked that another reserve be established in
Wyoming in order that there might be an assured supply east of the Rocky
Mountains. Accordingly, Reserve No, 3 (Teapot Dome), the most famous and
scandal ridden of the Navy's Petroleum Reserves, came into being near
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Utah and two in Colorado) and Reserve No. 4 (Alaska) were established
because it was concluded, based on fuel oil usage, that the Reserves
I, 2, and 3 were inadequate. A more detailed history of these reserves
is beyond the scope of this paper.
World War I to 1941 ,
During World War I, sufficient oil was obtained and distributed to
meet the needs of the fleet » However 9 at that time, mechanized warfare
and military aircraft took on new importance with resultant large demands
for petroleum fuels,, This began the independent procurement competition
by the Services to obtain their requirements of petroleum. The Services
established and maintained their own separate petroleum logistic systems
including requirements determination, purchase responsibility, distribution,
and bulk terminal operations. In the years to follow, mounting United
States oil reserves and industry refinery capability were such that neither
the government nor the Services were much concerned for their petroleum
supply. The Navy expanded its strategically located terminals and de-
veloped a vast network of bulk terminals; and fueling- at-sea met with
considerable success.
Coordinated Efforts after 1941 .
Before the United States entered World War II, the need for coordinated
control of petroleum became evident. A synopsis of this effort beginning
in 1941 follows.
Petroleum Coordinator for National Defense . Early in 1941 the Secretary
of Interior was appointed the Petroleum Coordinator for National Defense
with the broad function of coordinating the government's needs. However,
the Services continued to purchase their own requirements, thus placing
15

them in competition for products in short supply in the national economy.
In December 1942, the authority of the Secretary of Interior was in-
creased, and he was assigned the task of making "petroleum available
adequately and continuously in the proper form, at the proper places,
to meet military and civilian needs".
Army-Navy Petroleum Board
. In July 1942, the Army-Navy Petroleum
Board (ANPB) was established to achieve better coordination. At the
same time, Area Petroleum Officers were established on the staffs of
overseas theater commanders to ensure coordinated planning and an adequate
12
supply of product in the field. The ANPB became an agency of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in 1943 and was charged with, "determining petroleum re-
quirements for the military departments in accordance with over-all
logistic plans, determining and designating for each petroleum product
13
the appropriate service procuring agency (coordinated purchase),...."
Joint Army-Navy Petroleum Purchasing Agency . In July 1945, the change
was made from coordinated purchasing to joint purchasing when the Joint
Army-Navy Petroleum Purchasing Agency (JANPPA) was established. Joint
purchasing of petroleum products was accomplished by grouping petroleum
purchasing sections of the Services into a single geographical location.
Although this did not actually put a central procurement system into
effect, a method of cross procurement was actually developed between the
George C. Dyer, USN (RET), Naval Logistics , (Annapolis, Maryland:
United States Naval Institute, 1960), p. 201.
12
See page 21 for more detailed discussion of Area Petroleum Offices
13





Services. This resulted in considerable savings --both in time and money.
JANPPA and ANPB existed until the National Security Act of 1947, which
eliminated the ANPB and provided for replacement of JANPPA.
Armed Services Petroleum Purchasing Agency
. In February 1948, the
Armed Services Petroleum Purchasing Agency (ASPPA) was established to
take over the purchase function. This agency was the first jointly staffed
agency to be created under the National Security Act of 1947 to perform
single point procurement. It became a joint purchasing agency with the
dual mission of contracting for the petroleum needs of the Services and
arranging for and coordination of the distribution of all purchases. How-
ever, the inventory control function was retained by the individual Services
along with the control of the distribution system.
Military Petroleum Supply Agency . The cumulation of the petroleum
coordinated efforts of the military since 1941 resulted in the adoption
of the single manager plan (modified) for petroleum products. Promulgated
January 3 9 1956, by Department of Defense Directive 5160.12, the primary
objectives of the single manager plan were said to be: (1) to eliminate
duplication and overlapping of effort between and among the military
departments, and (2) to improve the effectiveness and economy of supply
14
and service operations throughout the Department of Defense,
These objectives, of course, were not new. They only reflected the
goals of single service procurement, joint purchasing assignment, and co-
ordinated programs. Perhaps the most distinctive feature of the single
14
United States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on
Government Operations, Military Supply Management , Hearings Before Sub-
committee, 86th Congress, 1st Session, House Report No, 674, July 15, 1959,
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 10,
17

manager plan was to vest in a single military department the responsibility
for procurement, stock maintenance., and distribution of a selected com-
modity (common type) for all military users. Stock funds were to be used
in effecting these transactions
.
In consonance with the basic principles of the single manager plan,
it was originally proposed that the stocks of petroleum held by the three
services be transferred to a Military Petroleum Supply Agency (MPSA) . The
agency would perform all procurement, manage inventory stocks, and sell
through the usual stock-funding arrangements to the retail level of service
users. However, when the proposal was presented to the military depart-
ments, a three-way split developed.
The Air Force opposed any change in stock ownership , its
argument based on the necessity of maintaining continuous control
of its war reserves of petroleum. The Army proposed to limit
agency stock ownership to continental United States, The Navy
proposed that the,-agency 's stock ownership extend to certain
overseas stocks.
Because of the wide divergence, the decision was made to leave stock owner-
ship in the Services without change, which happened to be the Air Force's
position.
In July 1956, the MPSA was formed as the fourth original Single Man-
1 f\
ager Operating Agency. MPSA was activated on 7 January 1957 as a means
of improving the effectiveness and economy of petroleum supply and
service operations throughout the Defense Establishment. ASPPA was then
dissolved with MPSA assuming that agency's function. Operations were ex-










procurement inspection, training, and war planning . However, funding,
stock ownership, and inventory control were excluded. These functions
remained the responsibility of the Services. Thus the MPSA charter
emerged with a deviation from the single manager concept. This was said
to be justified by the characteristics of petroleum and the exceptional
conditions encountered in the supply and distribution of this commodity
by the military departments. In December 1959, after a year of operations
a Department of Defense survey team from the Logistics System Study Project
(LSSP) commented, "There is in fact no single manager for petroleum in
17
the Department of Defense." This was due to the compromise of the single
manager concept.
Gradually the agency was granted more authority. In March 1960,
MPSA was given full authority and responsibility to select sources of
product and means of transportation to meet re-supply requirements in-
volving tanker and tanker/barge combination movements to bulk terminals
1 o
world-wide. In May 1961, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed
that the scope of management by MPSA would be extended to include owner-
ship, funding, and centralized management of wholesale stocks of Packaged
19
Petroleum Products.
Defense Fuel Supply Center . On 1 January 1962, MPSA was incorporated
into the Defense Supply Agency with the new idenity of "Defense Petroleum
Supply Center" being changed to "Defense Fuel Supply Center" (DFSC) on
17
Ibid .
, p . 31.
Military Petroleum Supply Agency, Memorandum from the Director
,
File 4020, Washington, D. C, January, 1960, p. 1.
19
Military Petroleum Supply Agency, Memorandum from the Director
,
18 August 1961, p. 1.
19

1 February 1964,, Formally, one of the seven single manager agencies
established by DOD for the management of common-use items and services,
its functions and operations were substantially the same as those pre-
20
viously assigned to MPSA. Today these principal functions are:
1. Manage packaged petroleum products.
2. Conduct world-wide procurement of products.
3. Determine source of product, arrange tanker transportation,
and place Army/Navy orders.
4. Contract for storage, and services.
5. Direct the procurement inspection program.
6„ Coordinate cataloging.
7. Coordinate interservice supply support.
8. Coordinate standardization.
9„ Coordinate petroleum training.
It should be noted that in the operations of DFSC there are several sig-
nificant variations from the operations of the other commodity centers
21
under DSA. Principal variations are:
1. Procurement and distribution are world-wide in scope.
2. Direct communications are authorized between DFSC and the Unified
Commands
.
3. DFSC does not compute net requirements and does not exercise
stock financing for bulk petroleum. ^
20




In October 1962 , DPSC assumed the management of wholesale stocks
of packaged petroleum products within the United States.
20

Joint Petroleum Offices . Because the volume of petroleum products
required in the military theaters during World War II, the Army-Navy
Petroleum Board established an Area Petroelum Office in each theater
to coordinate requirements, delivery, and handling. Later these offices
were designated as Joint Petroleum Offices (Jpo)o They were established
as a staff agency of the area or theater commander with staff jurisdic-




1. Coordinate logistic policy and planning in conjunction with DFSC
2. Consolidate theater peacetime requirements and formulation of
replenishment program and distribution system.
3. Coordinate the quality surveillance program within the unified
command
.
4. Monitor the prescribed service levels of major items to insure
adequacy of stocks.
Sub Area Petroleum Offices . The Sub Area Petroleum Offices (SAPO)
function as an extension of the JPO organization at a lower level within
the Unified Command. While the JPO exercises staff functions, the SAPOs
are concerned with the day-to-day operations. They are responsible for
receipt, storage, and distribution ashore within their respective areas.
Navy requirements are consolidated by the SAPO with other services in
their areas for submission to the JPO. From JPO requirements for all
Services are consolidated for submission to DFSC. This requirements
forecast is called a "slate".
23
Petroleum Logistics , op. cit., p. 50, p. 183,
21

The Monthly Bulk POL Slate is the medium by which consumption,
inventory, and requirements for bulk fuels is made known to the Joint
Petroleum Office and the DFSC Although the bulk slate is not a re-
quisition, per se, it does serve as the basic document supporting
purchase action„ In addition, the bulk fuel quantities indicated on
the slate as "required" for each of the next five months support requests
24








ANALYSIS OF THE BULK PETROLEUM LOGISTIC SYSTEM
General
There are three fundamental logistical elements to any support
problem. They are (1) determination of requirements, (2) procurement of
25
these requirements, and (3) distribution of that which has been procured.
The problems associated with carrying out these functions for petroleum
has existed for nearly half a century. They involve the need for a depend-
able, responsive, and economical petroleum logistic system. Dependability
and responsiveness, unquestionably, override consideration of economy dur-
ing war time; however, basic theories of economies (the allocation of scarce
resources) cannot be totally disregarded in either peace or war. The less
resources required for support of military operations,, in terms of logistics,
the more resources become available for research and development, pro-
curement of weapon systems and military hardware, and for allocation to
the civilian economy. The question posed then, is how well the petroleum
logistic system today meets the demands of dependability, responsiveness,
and economy? To answer this, we must first look at the basic elements of
logistics as they apply to petroleum. This discussion will focus pri-
marily on bulk products.
Determination of Requirements
The Defense Fuel Supply Center (DFSC) does not compute net require-
ments for bulk petroleum. This responsibility remains with the individaul
Service. Consequently, the Chief of Naval Operations, based on approved
25




Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Strategic and Logistic Plans, establishes
Navy world-wide, peacetime, and mobilization reserve stock levels for
petroleum products , Using these stock levels, the Fuel Supply Office
determines the net requirements for bulk petroleum within the continental
United States. Likewise, the Navy's overseas stocking points also assume
the responsibility for maintaining these levels which are subject to review
by the FSCL Overseas requirements are computed by each Service for its
forces within the theater, and are submitted to the Joint Petroleum Office
for consolidation and subsequent forwarding to the DFSC. Frequent meetings
between the Services, MSTS , and DFSC are held to coordinate requirements
for further procurement and distribution action.
During World War II and in subsequent years, petroleum has been singled
out for specialized handling from the JCS level down through the Depart-
ments and the overseas commands „ Varying degrees of direction is provided
to the inventory control points from the respective military departments
in computation of levels for operating stocks, mobilization reserves, and
facilities o Each Service has problems peculiar to its assigned mission.
The essentiality of petroleum is absolute with little opportunity for sub-
stitution. Therefore, having the right products at the right place and
at the right time deserves the utmost attention.
The matter of realistic valid POL consumption factors for computing
peacetime and mobilization reserve stocks and routing operational re-
quirements for bulk petroleum products is worthy of mention, POL con-
sumption factors applicable to U„ S. Naval vessels operating under wartime
conditions are prepared by the Bureau of Ships. These fuel rates, either
underway or not underway, are based on an assumed speed, or fcr an aver-
age speed during a period of data for each type or class of vessel. Then
24

with a model of the "forces" listing each vessel by type, these fuel
rates can be applied to compute the estimated consumption, A similar
system is utilized for the computation of aviation fuel requirements.
It is not intended to imply that this system will not produce satisfac-
tory results. However, from experience, this writer has found that although
the rates may be reasonably accurate for the steaming speeds on which they
are based (WW II), there are other factors that directly affect fuel con-
sumption estimates; i.e., type of operations in which engaged, length
of operations, whether ships are operating with a carrier task force or
independent, and even seasonal conditions (typhoons) affect both flying
and ship operation„ Also, the tables do not include complete consumption
data for all ship-classes; the latest additions to the fleet have not
been added. This is certainly an area that deserves consideration of




The determination of requirements; i.e., what is needed, where it is
needed, and when it is needed, forms the basis for all procurement action.
This tremendous responsibility, which includes world-wide procurement of
petroleum products for all three Services, is a primary function of the
DFSC. Without question, it is big business. In Fiscal Year 1963, total
dollar procurement was nearly $1.2 billion. Of this amount, 89.9 percent
26
was competitive. At the end of January 1964, total dollar procurements
2 6
Defense Fuel Supply Center, Command Review, 2 March 1964, p. 30,
25

were running at a rate slightly ahead of the same period for 1963 and
27
competitive procurement was up 2 . 3 percent.
Majority of petroleum products purchased in the continental U, S
„
and Caribbean areas are negotiated,, Contracts, as a general rule, are
6 months in duration and are of the "open end" type, obligating the
Government to take only that quantity which it specifically orders . On
this type contracts no funds are cited. Small business participation in
procurement over the past few years has fluctuated mildly. In general,
participation has remained in the vicinity of 20 to 23 percent of the
total U. S, procurement for products and services.
In determining the combination of awards which will result in the
lowest over-all cost to the Government
s
many calculations must be made.
For jet fuel (JP-4) this is a matter of matching bids from over 200
sources with requirements for over 300 destinations and applying over 2500
different transportation rates. It is in effect a sequential selection
procedure that must consider successively each of the many combinations
which are reasonably feasible, DFSC has applied linear programming using
electronic data processing techniques to reduce procurement lead time and
28
to evaluate bids.
Funding , Bulk Navy procurements are initially funded by means of the
Navy Stock Fund (NSF) „ The Bureau of Supplies and Accounts administers
the NSF for products purchased under its inventory control. The typical
funding cycle for a revolving fund prevails; i.e.., the NSF finances











the NSF is reimbursed when the final charge is made to the appropriation
for end use expenditure. Just as the Navy budgets for procurement of
bulk petroleum, the other military departments likewise, but independently,
perform this function.
Distribution
Each military service has its own petroleum distribution system
(modified). As mentioned earlier, DFSC has full authority and responsi-
bility to select sources of product and means of transportation to meet
resupply requirements involving tanker and tanker/barge combination move-
ments to bulk terminals world-wide „ Coordination between the Services
and DFSC plays a significant role in petroleum distribution.
Continental United States. Within the continental United States, the
basic distribution pattern for aviation fuels and other bulk fuels is to
use the commercial distribution systems to the maximum extent practicable.
That is, contracts are for direct delivery from industry to the consuming
activity. When overland transportation is required, pipelines are used
whenever possible. Many bases and stations are being serviced direct from
29
industry by utilizing the pipeline method.
Approximately 50 percent of the fuels moved from industry to military-
owned or leased terminals is further distributed to continental activities
30
and overseas destinations or issue to fleet units. This is accomplished
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La Motte, £p_. cit . , p. 101
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through coordinated efforts of the Services and DFSC
Overseas
.
Supply to overseas commands is accomplished primarily
through the Joint Petroleum Offices . DFSC provides a central liaison
between these offices and the military departments and is responsible for
31
coordinating all distribution to overseas commands.
Cross -servicing . In significant contrast to the situation existing
in the United States is the unified commands overseas where cross-servicing
and single stock ownership has been established „ Each military department
is responsible for cross servicing a product world-wide. This responsibility
is based upon a mutual agreement of the departments concerned. The major
factor involved in determining these responsiblities is which Service has
the predominate interest in each product and the facilities to handle its
distribution.
Under this plan in each overseas area, each product is assigned to a
single Service as its responsibility for submitting requirements for purchase
to DFSC and for funding the stocks for movement into the area. The depart-
ment owning the terminal activity at which the product is stored retains
ownership of such facilities and continues to operate the facilities for
all three Services. Maintenance and operating cost of facilities is borne
by the owning Service, regardless of product ownership.
In WESTPAC for example, all Navy Special Fuel Oil and Jet Fuel (JP-5)
are owned by the Navy and all Aviation Fuel 115/145 is owned by the Air Force.
All fuel depots for "bunkering" and Fleet Oiler resupply in Japan are oper-
ated by the Army. Here we observe the marriage of two supposedly incompatible
ideas—competition and cooperation--with all three Services working together
31 T , ,Ibid
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and participating in providing coordinated logistic support with uncommon
ownership of stocks to serve each others' needs.
Storage
.
Planning for petroleum storage is undertaken within JCS to
support the JCS Strategic and Logistic Plans. Such plans are general and
detailed implementation takes place at the military department level and
below. DFSC coordinates the storage positioning of mobilization reserve
and peacetime operating stocks in accordance with DOD policies, operational
needs, and with further consideration of the wartime missions of the military
services
.
In overseas areas, petroleum storage may be either military owned
and operated or contracted for commercially. DFSC contracts on a world-wide
basis for all commercial storage. Facilities contracted for are the opera-
tional responsibility of the requesting Service. Where service competition
exists for available commercial storage DFSC undertakes to arbitrate the
matter and then allocate storage in a manner of best interest and needs of
the military establishment.
Analy s Is .
Having briefly looked at the basic elements of petroleum logistics and
the responsibilities of the individual Servicesand DFSC, it has been found
relative to bulk products that:
a. Computation of net requirements and funding these requirements
is a responsibility of the three Service'
b. Procurement is the responsibility of DFSC.
c. Distribution is a coordinated responsibility of the three
Services and DFSC.
Thus, DFSC is not a fully integrated manager. This immediately gives rise
to the question, "Why not?".
29

In supporting its mission, the military is limited by the resources
allocated to national defense „ Within these resource constraints, the criterion
is one of choosing among alternatives in an attempt to maximize gain. Hitch
and McKean, in their book, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age
,
list
several approaches for obtaining efficiency in the military, where no price
32
mechanisms and other natural elements for forcing efficiency are available.
One approach is increased recognition and awareness that: military decisions,
whether they involve budgetary allocations or not, are economic decisions,
and that unless the right questions are asked, the appropriate alternatives
selected for comparison and the criterion for choosing the most efficient
33
utilization of resources will suffer.
Relative to petroleum logistics we are seeking the most dependable,
responsive, and economical system possible. For analysis purposes, one
alternative available is to fully integrate DFSC. But would such a change
provide additional efficiency and a better system?
Various studies of the fully integrated managers of commodities common
to all Services have concluded that the significant economies are derived
from the elimination of concurrent buying and selling, reduction of cross
hauls and back hauls through more integrated distribution;, payroll reduction,
better procurement operations, more favorable prices by consolidating total
defense requirements, and stimulation of item reduction. In short, avoid
duplication, overlapping facilities, and achieve better management.
32
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Bulk military petroleum products include aviation fuels, jet fuels
34
motor gasolines, kerosenes, diesel fuels, solvents, and boiler fuels.
There is hardly an opportunity for item reduction except through research
and development of fuels that can be substituted for or will replace
another fuel. Alternatively, there is the development of propulsion equip-
ments that will burn the same fuel; i.e., a fuel for ships, a fuel for air-
craft, etc. Here, one must consider what the future holds in the way of
"nuclear power" . In years to come, who knows whether or not the Captain's
gig might not be powered by nuclear energy?
Actually, there is little opportunity for duplication of products in
the bulk petroleum area. The Navy is primarily a user of Navy Special
35
Fuel Oil (NSFO) and JP-5 jet fuel, the Air Force is a primary user of
aviation fuel grade 114/145, and JP-4 jet fuel, and the Army uses primarily
diesel and motor gasoline. This is not to say that the Navy does not use
diesel or other bulk products, but to emphasize that bulk usage is concen-
trated on several products for the three services.
To meet the operating and mobilization requirement, the DFSC and the
Services jointly compare requirements and facilities. Where the require-
ment of one Service can be met with the capability of another Service, this
is done. Adjacent facilities may exist, but overlapping facilities should
not occur.
34Certain grades of lube oil are also distributed in bulk.
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JP-5 is a special "high flash" kerosene, It was developed specific
ally for safe storage in CV tanks. BuShips has authorized the issue and
use of JP-5 in lieu of diesel fuel for diesel engines where improved logis




Better management under the integrated system is problematical and
depends upon the basis from which approached. The integrated manager's
mission is predicated upon generating operational economies „ The Services
argue that this is good only to the extent that it does not deny them the
ability to carry out their responsibility to know and control their
readiness position; and, also, that the authority for logistic support
of items vital and critical to the success or failure of a military engage-
ment must follow responsibility.
In the case of bulk petroleum, the single manager concept has certainly
proven its management ability in the area of procurement. DFSC consolidates
requirements from the three Services for procurement purposes. The economics
and effectiveness of petroleum procurement under the single manager concept
is supported by the statements of the DOD Review Panel (Commodity Single
Manager Evaluation Study) after three years of operations. This study
indicated that the petroleum supply system of the DOD, which embraces the
operations of the Single Manager as well as the service supply systems,
provides a high degree of supply effectiveness . Customer satisfaction is
high; and the coordinated procurement of this vital commodity, petroleum,
36
is handled in a manner satisfactory to all of the Military Services. This
study was undertaken by the DOD, involving the Joint Staff of JCS , to determine
whether single managers had proved to be effective and economical in peacetime;
and, also, whether they possessed the requisite mobilization readiness and
wartime capabilities.
This brings up the point of what type of war we are preparing to support.
'•-
36
United States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on
Government Operations, Military Supply Management , Hearings before Sub-
committee, 86th Congress, Second Session, April 25, 26, 1960, <W -gton:
Government Printing Office, 1960), pp. 99-111.
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Hitch and McKean discuss three possible types of war: (1) all-out thermonuclear
war, (2) limited or local wars, and (3) large-scale or long wars such as
37
World War II. They conclude that the latter is the least likely to occur;
and that the relative probabilities of types 1 and 2 occurring will depend
in part on the policies that the United States pursues. Further, that prep-
aration to deal with only one type invites defeat by another.
The current petroleum organization, like other single managed commodities,
has not undergone the true test of readiness required in escalated Koreas
or a major war effort. It has responded, however, in recent crises in
Laos, Vietnam, and Cuba in meeting tremendous increases in demand for bulk
petroleum. There is no evidence to support a finding that it would be less
dependable or respond otherwise in wars involving larger and world-wide
petroleum demands.
Finally, are further economics possible in a fully integrated petroleum
logistic system without affecting the present dependability and responsive-
ness of the system? Integration would include additional responsibilities
such as: (1) inventory control to include computation of net bulk require-
ments, (2) funding and ownership of wholesale bulk stocks, and (3) direct
control of the whole distribution system.
Even if these responsibilities were taken from the Services and
centralized on one office, there would still be a significant amount of co-
ordination to be accomplished—coordination as practiced in the present
systenu Planned requirements, exercise requirements, location changes for
aircraft squadrons, ship concentration information, etc., must be fed to
the manager. Presently, DFSC deals with the inventory control point as
the representative of each Service. If the inventory control point were
37




eliminated, DFSC would deal with many offices within the departments
.
There would be no one office to coordinate the bulk petroleum plans and
programs of the individual Services unless another office were established
or this function absorbed in the current organization „ If another office
were established or the function absorbed in the current organization, it
would require personnel. At the same time, more personnel would probably
be needed in DFSC to accomplish some of the functions being performed
by the inventory control points. As a matter of information^ there have
been no personnel savings since the creation of MPSA because no offices
were consolidated; consequently, there has been an increase of some 250
38
people including about 20 officers from the three Services,
Presently, DFSC appears to have direct control of the major part of
petroleum distribution. Approximately 50 percent is moved from industry
to military or leased terminals for further distribution to continental
activities, overseas destinations, and for issue to fleet units, DFSC
controls the tanker movements to overseas areas as well as tanker/barge
movements in the United States, When the tanker/barge quantity of re-
distribution plus the issues to fleet units are considered, the quantity
remaining does not seem so signif leant— particularly for the Navy,
Although the Services fund and own the wholesale bulk petroleum stock
s
does this really cause additional expense? Supporters of the argument for
central control of the moneys argue that it gives the manager the authority
for decision concerning "when to buy" and that procurement costs can be
decreased under the Economic Order Quantity, Most contracts for bulk
product are "open end" type for 6 months duration and longer. Funds are
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not cited until an order is placed. Requirements during normal operations
are relatively steady (high volume, low variance). During a crisis re-
quirements change constantly and drastically. Before procurement can be.
effected for a large quantity of bulk petroleum, there must be adequate
expected storage at time of delivery. Stock turnover must be within speci-
fied intervals or the product may become unfit for its intended use.
Inventories are measured in days of supply. Even though back-up stocks
are in the petroleum industries' refineries and terminals, the industries
are faced with practical limitation on their inventories which average
39
only about 60 days. It appears there are many limitations other than











Nearly half a century has elapsed since the Navy was initially faced
with the problem of assured fuel oil supply and its related distribution.
Propulsion equipment has advanced from coal burning to oil
s
and now the
prospect of increased utilization of fissionable energy. Realistically,
extensive use of the latter is not in the near future Therefore, the
petroleum logistic system must meet the fuel demands of the present-day
military operations
s
which hinge almost entirely on the use of petroleum-
consuming machines
.
The bulk petroleum logistic system is dependable and responsive.
It provides the bulk products when they are needed, where they are needed,
and in the quantities required. There is no evidence to support a con-
clusion that the system would react differently in possible future crises,
including local and limited wars or a long war of the World War II type.
No matter what type of system we have, response in the event of an all-
out nuclear war will depend on support facilities remaining (after attack)
and the Petroleum Industries' ability to provide product that may be
required--not on a modified centralized versus decentralized system.
The criterion that must be satisfied is one of economy without sac-
rificing readiness. Whether in peace or war, the allocation of resources
must be utilized to the fullest advantage. The less resources required
for logistic support, the more resources become available for other means
vital to national defense and the civilian economy.
It appears in bulk petroleum logistics that the modified single manager
concept is providing significant savings in the procurement and distribution
36

area. Whether additional economies are possible in a fully integrated
system is problematical. For an item so vital to the success or failure
of a military engagement there must be special coordination of that item
within the military departments . (We have seen how product usage con-
centrates in one Service.) The current inventory control points pro-
vide this function.
The number of bulk items is few; but the dollar expenditure is enormous.
This fact coupled with their vital nature and lack of opportunity for sub-
stitution makes close item review most desirable. Whether this is done
by DFSC or the individual Service , it requires personnel. Since the majority
of contracts for bulk petroleum are of the open end type, with no funds
cited, there appears to be no significant advantage to be gained by central
funding. DFSC controls all tanker/barge distribution world-wide, which
together with shipments direct from industry to consumer via pipeline,
rail, etc., accounts for the majority of all distribution.
Generalities such as duplication of stock at one or more sources,
procurement of items already in long supply or held by another Service,
cross hauling, back hauling, etc., are easy to charge and in some rare
cases easy to prove. But would a centralized system be a panacea to the
problem? Hitch and McKean point out that "Unfortunately the superficial
illogicalities of decentralization are more strikingly obvious than the
40deadening consequences of extreme centralization." They further indicate
that the bureaucratic regulations and the paper work needed to prevent such
occurrences, as stated above, would undoubtedly be far more costly and far
more damaging to efficiency than any conceivable gains.
40




Under the present Defense Logistic Service Center procedures, the
Military Services have the prerogative through item management coding of
retaining those items which they consider essential to weapons systems,
even though the item class is centrally managed. Certainly bulk petroleum
products would be considered in the "essential" category.
Initially, when this paper was begun, it was felt that DFSC should be
given full authority in the area of petroleum logistics--a fully integrated
system, However after research and study of materials available, this
writer concludes that the significant economies to be gained in the bulk




It is recommended that no further integration of functions be effected
in the bulk petroleum logistic system at this time*
The following areas are recommended for further research:
a. Naval Petroleum and Oil Shale Reserves. This is certainly an
area for research in determination of whether or not the Navy needs
control of the reserves today or should they be turned over to private
industry, Here one must consider the political implications
„
b„ Bulk Petroleum Consumption Factors, The entire area of the ne thod
of computing consumption factors for ships and aircraft should be carefully
studied to determine the most valid means of computation,
c. Economics of Ownership and Operation of Bulk Petroleum Storage.
This study would include an analysis of the present cost factors involved
in (1) Government ownership and operation of storage, (2) Government owner-
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